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Consumer Protection and Product Liability:
Europe and the EEC
Thomas Trumpy*
I. Introduction
Product liability is increasingly and correctly considered a public
consumer protection issue,' rather than a civil tort or contract mat-
ter.2 Consumer protection is a new field necessitated by the sophisti-
cated technologies and expanded markets that emerged as a result of
post-World War II industrial development. 3 Consumer protection
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I For historical reasons, the Consumer Protection Directorate of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), General Directorate XI, is separate from and in competition for
funding with, the Trade Directorate, General Directorate III, which is responsible for
product liability. See infra note 11. An example of a consumer protection measure against
dangerous products that is not part of "product liability" is the EEC Directive requiring
notification of a "transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste." See BEUC NEWS, July/Aug.
1984, at 3.
2 The common law concept of tort is not exactly matched in the civil law. The only
civil law code of "delicts" is found in the criminal code, which permits joinder of a private
civil claim for relief to a criminal action for theft, embezzlement, fraud, etc. See infra note
19. The commercial code classifies consumer torts as failures to meet very broadly defined
obligations of fair dealing in contractual matters (a sort of delictus ex contract i). For these
reasons, the protection of consumers against false advertising and other unfair pre-contrac-
tual practices not constituting criminal fraud has been by statute and any existing regula-
tions and case law.
Liability with respect to the fitness of the merchandise for its intended use is not cov-
ered by the EEC Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210)
29 (1985). It is solely a subject of national law and the OECD programs. See ilfra note 13
on warranties. The Directive is to be effective (by national legislation) onJuly 30, 1988.
Paragraph "d" of the introductory commentary to article 6 of the original proposal for the
EEC Product Liability Directive (COM (76) 372 Final) provides for reservation of rights
based on contract to "the laws of the Member States by the law relating to the sale of
goods. This field is not affected by the Directive." The commentary on article II speaks
in confused terms of the directive relating to tort and not contract. Mr. H.C. Taschner
from EEC General Directorate III, "author" of the Directive, confirmed the "delictual"
character of the EEC cause of action at a meeting on November 26, 1985 in Brussels.
-t Principal consumer protection laws have only been enacted recently. See OECD,
CONSUMER POLICY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS: MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 21,
22 (1983); OECD, ANNUAl. REPORTS ON CONSUMER POLICY IN OECD MEMBER COUNTrRIFS
(1983). Prior efforts were frequently rather tentative because of an insufficient under-
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has also been shaped by the gradual attitudinal shift from laissezfaire
capitalism to state guardianship of its citizens.
Evolution of consumer protection law has been tortuous in
countries like the United States where common law tort principles
such as caveat emptor and contract rules requiring privity between the
defendant manufacturer or seller and the injured party have imposed
quasi-contractual limits on responsibility. 4  U.S. courts have been
hindered in attempting to balance the interests of consumers, produ-
cers, sellers, lessors, and insurers because common law legal princi-
ples predicated on antiquated notions like the artisan's duty to his
client do not reflect modern commercial realities.
Certain civil law legal theories have made evolution of consumer
protection law less difficult in Europe.5 These theories provided at
standing of market dynamics, and such efforts were only precatory and lacked rapid public
enforcement and private recourse provisions. See also L 'Organisation et IInformation des Con-
sommateurs dans la Communaute Europeenne, DOCUMENTATION EUROPEENNE (1973).
In 1975 the EEC Consumer Programme was drafted under the title Council Resolu-
tion of April 14, 1975 on a Preliminary Programme of the European Economic Commu-
nity for a Consumer Protection and Information Policy, 18 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 92) 1
(1975), which was renewed in 1981. Council Resolution of May 19, 1981 on a Second
Programme of the European Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and Infor-
mation Policy, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 133) 1 (1981). The Programme is directed to
consumer information and protection pursuant to articles 2 and 85 of the Treaty of Rome,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. The Programme as a whole has not yet been proposed
for adoption as EEC law, each proposal for law being specific. In those areas where the
member countries harmonize regulations and develop standards by direct, non-EEC ac-
tion, EEC action may become moot. See infra notes 11, 46.
A balance sheet of EEC proposed actions and complete directives appears in BEUC
NEws, Nov. 1983, at 11.
4 Protection arising out of a contract has been derived from the commercial code. See,
e.g., FRENCH CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] arts. 1134, 1135 (requiring respect for a party's agree-
ments and the "good faith" performance of such engagements). The RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1979) provides similarly that:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or his prop-
erty, if:
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although:
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
5 The theory of concealed defect ("vice cache" in French) has a long history. Under
French C. Civ. art. 1641, no disclaimer can excuse or limit damages For a concealed defect.
but notice as to the proper conditions for use can avoid liability for misuse. The very strict
position of the French law, compared to the demands of other EEC countries for various
limits and exclusions, was one of the reasons for the difficulty of the EEC in reaching
agreement on the EEC Product Liability Directive.
Strict liability, particularly for physical injury or death from inherently imperceivable
risks, such as with pharmaceuticals, exists in:
. Germany by statute (with a ceiling on total damages) (law of August 21,
1946);
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least as much real consumer protection in Europe prior to 1960 as in
the United States, although cases reported in the United States
would suggest U.S. consumers were better protected. Few persons
on either continent, however, were as offended or belligerent, persis-
tent and wealthy as Mr. MacPherson when his beautiful Buick pro-
pelled him into legal history.6 In practice, both U.S. and European
consumers had few avenues for legal recourse until recently.
A. Scope and Analysis
This article only examines issues relevant to the U.S. bar, con-
sumer groups, and corporations. 7 Consequently, other concerns
equally important to Europeans such as consumer protection for
services like package holidays, 8 investment advice,9 and purely
"legal" issues such as successor corporation liability'0 will not be
discussed.
There are four approaches to analyzing consumer protection
problems that are useful in different circumstances. Discussion of
each of these categories will facilitate understanding of this article.
First, the jurisdictional approach encompasses the following is-
sues which define parties having rights to complain:
1. Protection of the person (health and safety);I
2. Sweden by agreement with the industry;
3. Belgium, France, and Luxembourg by case law based on code.
Such liability does not exist in the United Kingdom.
A case in the United Kingdom required proof of negligence even when this would
require access to otherwise inaccessible files. See British Charity or American Justice, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 1984, at 28.
See the discussion of no-fault in Sweden and Germany (law of August 21, 1976) in
Dossier, BEUC NEWS, Feb. 1984, at 1. See also the defenses provided in the EEC Product
Liability Directive, supra note 2, article 7, and the burden of proof of victims under article
4; see the defenses provided in the Strasbourg Convention, infra note 118.
6 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (cited in Gold-
stein, Product Liability and the Trademark Owner: When a Trademark Is a Warranty, 32 Bus. LAW.
957 (1979)).
7 Thus, door-to-door solicitations, retail and minimum pricing laws, product testing
and labeling procedures, promotional or discount price schemes, and services are beyond
the scope of this article.
8 See OECD, CONSUMER PROTECTION CONCERNING AIR PACKAGE TOURS (1980); see
infra note 14.
) See generally OECD, ANNUAL REPORT ON CONSUMER POLICY IN OECD MEMBER
COUNTRIES (1985).
lo The law on this problem is not developed in Europe. No consideration of this
problem has been undertaken under the EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, and
no cases to date were mentioned by the EEC staff in 1984.
i ILabeling
As to labeling, see U.C.C. § 2-314(2), (6) (1978); Goldstein, supra note 6, at 965; The
European Community Directive on Food Labeling, BEUC Document 92/82, July 1982, at
12 (speaking favorably of the harmonizing effect of the Directive). Amendments to the
Directive are expected by 1987. The French Cour de Cassation (Cour de Cass., Civ. lere,
14.12.1982) interpreted article 1135 of the French Civil Code to find that a manufacturer's
obligation to provide information about a product arose out of the "'obligation, not only
for what is expressed in (the conventions), but also for all the consequence which equity,
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2. Protection of the property rights (of buyers, owners, les-
usage or law confers on this obligation, according to its nature." BEUC LEGAL NEWS,
Sept. 1984, at 11.
See also a Danish case where "seconds" (second choice quality goods) were imported
as first quality goods. In interpreting article 30 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, the
court held that the nature of the imported goods has to be indicated. Hojesterets Dec. 2,
1981, Ugeskrift for Retsvaesen 1982, at 69-79, discussed in BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 1983,
at 8 (citing IMERCO, 1981 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 181).
Requirements of the EAN labeling provision (European Article Numbering system of
"bar codes" on consumer products) and of the EEC Food Labeling Directive, 22 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 33) 1 (1979), include: product name, ingredients, quantity, durability, stor-
age conditions, EEC producer or seller, origin, and use instruction.
The Dangerous Product Directives
Based upon its conclusion that the pharmaceutical and cosmetic standards set by EEC
General Directorate III do not apply to or allow the adoption of emergency measures, the
EEC Commission determined that products subject to such other directives were not to be
excluded from the new directive-an unfortunate duplication of incompetence in this
field. Products may be excluded in the future if found to have an adequate "early warn-
ing" system.
The EEC originally regulated cosmetics and foodstuffs through exclusionary lists of
prohibited ingredients. Since 1982 the revised system establishes a list of "approved"
products to which the Commission can add by administrative directive. The potential
legal liability of the EEC for "approval" of a product which is later determined to be dan-
gerous is a subject awaiting analysis and commentary. Legal immunity appears not to exist.
EEC-Information Exchange
Dangerous Products
The EEC has adopted a system for rapid exchange of information on dangerous prod-
ucts. Dangerous Product Notification Directive 84/133/EEC, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
70) 16 (1984). See infra for the BEUC commentary on this dangerous products notifica-
tion procedure. This is an example of the confusion arising from the overlapping claims
of authority of General Directorate XI, responsible for consumer protection, and General
Directorate III (Trade), responsible for product liability and safety. Further confusion
arises because asbestos risks affecting workers arise mainly in the preparation of products,
and pursuant to articles 117 and 118 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, asbestos-related
injuries are placed under the surveillance of the Employment, Social Affairs and Education
General Directorate (Directorate V), not General Directorates III or XI. See Dossier, BEUC
NEWS, Sept. 1983.
One purpose of the Dangerous Product Notification Directive is to work out the
problems regarding the exclusion of certain products covered by other regulations. See
BEUC NEWS, Feb. 1984, at 6, for an analysis. See also EEC Technical Standards Directive
83/189/EEC, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 109) 8 (1983) (establishing an information pro-
cedure in the field of technical standards and rules).
The BEUC's comments on the Dangerous Product Notification Directive adopted by
the EEC in December 1983 are to the effect that:
1. a finding of a danger in one state will not bar sale elsewhere;
2. only states may give notice to the EEC;
3. such notices can be kept confidential by the EEC at the sender's re-
quest (incompatible with the statements of the EEC consumer program);
4. no warning is given to third countries; and
5. the scope of exemptions is not clear.
BEUC NEWS, Dec. 1983, at 5. The Directive does not establish or encourage product
recall or direct action. See infra note 42 for a summary of national legislation. See also
OECD, RECALL PROCEDURES FOR UNSAFE PRODucTs SoIm TO TilE PttLC (1981): BEUCs
Plea for a Consumer Safety Directive, BEUC NEWS LjEGAL. SUP'., June 1986, at 7.
Excess Detail
A recent case of rejection of a proposed directive lor excess detail is the Dangerous
Toy Directive rejected by the European Parliament. See BEUC NEWS, Feb. 1984, at 2 (re-
ferring to the draft directive, O]. No. C203/83). See also BEUC NEWS, Feb. 1986, at 14,
concerning need for action which is expected soon. A directive may be rejected when the
nature of the problem and diversity of the products are difficult to regulate. A more mod-
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sors, users, and others);' 2
est solution would be incorporation of existing industry norms as a directive. See infra note
42.
In the absence of an EEC instrument, the United Kingdom took separate action to ban
sale of children's toys with contaminated water inside. See Interpol, BEUC NEWS, Sept.
1983, at 1 ("bubble lamps" for children had been filled with tri- and tetra-chloroethylene
and carbon tetrachloride). For a review of pending national laws, decrees, and regula-
tions, see Toys Which Imitate Food Products, BEUC NEWS, Feb. 1985, at 15; see infra note 42.
Apparently when the substance is a toxic chemical (instead of contaminated water) the
EEC can act. Dangerous Substance Directive 79/769/EEC, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
197) 37 (1979); see also BEUC NEWS, Feb. 1984, at 2.
Manufacturer's Liability
A Belgian appeals court has ruled that a reseller of a dangerous product is not liable
for damages if the information on the product is not complete. Only the manufacturer is
liable for failure to inform the public. The result in this case would be interesting if arti-
cles 3.3, 5, and 8 of the EEC Directive were applied. BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 1984, at 10
(citing a decision of the Cour d'Appel ofJune 16, 1982). See also infra note 30.
Asbestos
As to the failure of two proposed directives (7975/83 SOC 159 ofJune 30, 1983 and
7503/83 ENT 54 of June 1983) to deal with exposure to asbestos despite the favorable
opinions of the Economic and Social Committee and of the Committee on the Environ-
ment, Public Health, and Consumer Protection of the European Parliament, see Dossier
Asbestos, BEUC NEWS, Sept. 1983. This important issue has become mired in a tug-of-war
between the European Parliament and the Commission.
Injury: Property and Persons
The EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, specifically provides for recoveries
by injured parties of money damages for:
1. damage to persons-injury or death (article 9(a));
2. damage to property (article 9(b)); and
3. pain, suffering, and "nonmaterial" damage.
A limitation in the amount of damages is permitted for the article 9(a) death or personal
injury loss under article 16.1. See infra note 112. "Commercial" property losses are ex-
cluded. See infra note 14.
"Pain and suffering" was put into the preamble and article 6(c) of the proposal for the
EEC Product Liability Directive as part of the parliamentary debates. It now appears in the
last paragraph of article 9 of the Directive, supra note 2. Pain and suffering damages are to
be determined in accordance with national law and thus, are not subject to the monetary
limits imposed by article 16 for death and personal injury damages. See infa note 112.
12 Advertising and Marketing Practices
The EEC Misleading Advertising Directive was finally adopted on Sept. 10, 1984,
84/450/EEC, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 250) 17 (1984). See Editorial, BEUC NEWS, June
1984, at 1. The Directive was supported by both manufacturers and consumers, but its
promulgation was delayed by the desire of certain countries (Britain, Denmark) to leave
this area to national regulation. For this reason, the "unfair advertising" aspects were
omitted from the final Directive. The same concerns have been expressed about the
"doorstep selling directive." Editorial, BEUC NEWS, Dec. 1983, at i.
The Misleading Advertising Directive has no provision for penalties or private causes
of action but permits national law to define who may have the requisite interest to bring
such an action if otherwise allowed by national law. Its utility is therefore correctly
suspect.
The Directive defines misleading advertising as "any advertising which in any way,
including its presentation deceives or is likely to deceive the persons to whom it is ad-
dressed or whom it reaches and which by reason of its deceptive nature is likely to aflect
their economic behaviour or which for those reasons injures or is likely to injure a compet-
itor." EEC Press Release IP (84) 234 ofJune 29, 1984. Concern is also being expressed
as to the problems of new advertising media and cross-border advertising. See BEUC
NEws, Jan. 1984, at 4. Interestingly, a recent Luxembourg law has unilaterally made ad-
vertising part of a contract of sale and permits rescission of the contract or a price reduc-
tion if those terms are breached by unfair advertising. See OECD, ADVERTISING
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3. Rights to the bargain (inconvenience or right to expected
PROCEDURES FOR UNSAFE PRODUCTS SOLD TO THE PUBLIC (1982); OECD, ADVERTISING Di-
RECTED AT CHILDREN (1982).
Liability for using a false or misleading representation as to goods or for failing to
correct significant information is imposed under the law of several Scandinavian countries.
See, e.g., Sweden's Marketing Practices Act, Act 1418 of 1975, amended by Act 233 of 1980,
§§ 3, 6 (omission to provide material information to consumers may result in court or-
dered disclosure; intentional misleading of consumers results in fines or imprisonment);
The Danish Marketing Practices Act, Act 297 ofJune 14, 1974, § 2 (use of false, mislead-
ing, or unreasonably incomplete statements regarding goods, real property, or services is
an offense).
An unusual development in Belgium is that the consumer association, "Test-Achats,"
has entered the business of offering legal assistance insurance to consumers for personal
disputes, including consumer disputes. BEUC NEWS LEGAL SUPP., Mar. 1985, at 10.
With respect to "door-to-door" selling, see Council Directive of December 20, 1985
to Protect the Consumer in Respect of Contracts Negotiated Away From Business Prem-
ises 85/577/EEC, 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 372) 31 (1985); Door-to-Door Sales, BEUC
NEws LEGAL Supp., Nov./Dec. 1985, at 1.
Warranty Terms
In the United Kingdom, the Consumer Credit Act of 1974 guarantees to the buyer
that products shall show "reasonable fitness" for intended use. This obligation of the
seller is in reality a limit on its liability as no redress is available to a victim if the reasona-
bleness standard is met. Whincup, Product Liability Laws in Common Market Countries, 19
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 521, 523 (1982). See summary of rules of EEC member states in
BEUC NEws, June 1986, at 5.
The EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, provides: "A product is de-
fective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect." The
Directive will therefore probably expand the British rule as to consumer rights and seller
liability.
The issue remains as to how a warranty of merchantability can be given if a product is
sold to another country and must meet the norms of the receiving country. A possible
solution would be for a manufacturer selling to the EEC to meet the highest safety stan-
dards of any EEC country under a theory that the products they sell must be safe, and that
selling them with a statement of the safety requirements of each receiving country (for
example, on grounded electric plugs) may not relieve the manufacturer of liability if the
standard is not met. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281
(1972).
Financing and Pricing Deception-Consumer Credit
The EEC Installment Sales-Consumer Credit Directive proposed in 1979 has been
reviewed by the European Parliament and is awaiting action. See Amended Proposal 27
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 83) 4 (1984). Most EEC countries regulate installment buying;
only France and Britain regulate other forms of credit.
As to requirements for indication of prices the EEC has:
1. adopted Directive 79/58 1/EEC, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 158) 19
(1979), as to the indication of food pricing (by weight or volume):
2. made a Proposal for a Council Directive on Consumer Protection in
Respect of the Indication of Prices of Non-Food Products, 27 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 8) 2 (1984).
The proposal was amended to allow greater freedom to member states. See fira note 46.
27 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 83) 4 (1984). The text, poorly drafted, is full of exemptions
(particularly pharmaceuticals and cosmetics) which will make member state laws difficult to
adopt without creating a vast bureaucracy or a mass of litigation. Adoption in (he present
form is doubtful. European Parliament action should be followed. See OECD, BARGAIN
PRICE OFFERS AND SIMILAR MARKETING PRACTICES (1980); OECD, PREMIUM OFFERS AND
SIMILAR MARKETING PRACTICES (1977).
Unfair Contract Terms
The EEC has released a discussion paper on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
which may lead to the preparation of a directive on this subject. Supplement 1/84 Bull.
E.C.Tlhe Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, adopted Resolution (78)3 onJan. 20,
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use); 3
4. Protection of economic rights (including rights between
merchants);14
5. Protection of the public interest in the safety and health of
its citizens.1 5
Second, consumer protection may be analyzed in terms of the
public or private remedies and responsibilities available in various
legal systems:
1. Private rights to money damages inherent in U.S.
jurisprudence; 16
2. Private rights to specific performance or putting the parties
in their expected/intended positions inherent in the European civil
code system;
17
3. Private rights to demand punishment of offenders, which
1978. It asks member states to ban certain types of penalty and forfeit clauses in consumer
contracts. See UNFAIR CONTRACT CLAUSES IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS (T. Bourgoignie ed.
1983); Killerby, The Work of the Council of Europe on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1 INT'L
CONTRACT 95 (1980); Hondius, Unfair Contract Terms: New Control Systems, 26 AM.J. COMP.
L. 525 (1978).
13 Extended Warranty
Extended warranty contracts are offered principally with goods such as automobiles
and major domestic appliances. These contracts cover the failure to function and any
damage to the goods caused by the product itself, including parts and labor. The legal
guarantee is not waived in any case. Exclusions cover:
1. damage caused by any unauthorized repairer or due to repair;
2. damage, depreciation, or replacement of consumable parts due to nor-
mal usage; and
3. any commercial use.
In case of total loss, there is a schedule of declining replacement value. InI some cases, the
extended warranty is offered and performed by the manufacturer. This type of warranty
disguises warranty defect replacement work with a customer-paid program, not required
to be included in the purchase price. The most probable areas of abuse will appear in
consumer fire and theft alarm systems, automobiles, and electric appliances. The EEC has
not considered these questions to date. See supra notes 11-12.
14 Loss of Profits and Earnings
The EEC Product Liability Directive does not cover loss in commercial sales, which
remain governed by national law. Statements in the preamble to the Directive limit claims
for property damage to personal property for personal use. See EEC Product Liability
Directive, supra note 2, art. 9(b). Loss of earnings due to "professional" use of the defec-
tive product are therefore excluded.
The Hague Convention covers damages to both persons and property, including eco-
nomic loss, when accompanied by other damages. Convention on the Law Applicable to
Products Liability, Oct. 2, 1973, 1977 Recueil des Traites et Accords de la France 82,
reprinted in PRODUCT LIABI.ITY IN EUROPE 127 (1975). The Strasbourg Convention does
not provide for loss of profits, but national laws in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands
permit recovery for such loss. Whincup, supra note 12.
i5 See supra notes 7, 11-14.
]( The award of punitive or exemplary damages to private parties, quite common in
the United States, is unknown in Europe, except for some representative consumer organi-
zations in France. The usual attitude is that any penalty belongs to the state, not the
aggrieved individual. We have found no reference to availability of augmented damages in
Europe. Occasionally fines may be imposed but not for the benefit of the victim and only
in France for a consumer group. Treble damages apparently do not exist in Europe.
17 In principle, EEC directives create no private actions; each country should adopt a
corresponding law. If a country has not acted, the only relief available would be in the
nature of a mandamus brought by the EEC Commission under article 169 of the Treaty of
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
involve distinct historical developments in each legal system;18
4. Civil law principles permitting joinder of a civil complaint
for money damages and perhaps for specific performance to a crimi-
nal complaint;'
9
5. Public remedies, including the state's rights as statutory
subrogee when it has undertaken, through social assurance pro-
grams like unemployment or workmen's compensation to stand in
the legal-place of the party civilly responsible for a person's depen-
dence on public resources;
20
6. Regulatory orders proscribing certain practices21 or affirm-
Rome directing a government to adopt legislation. But see Becker v. Finanzamtmuenster,
1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 53, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8789.
Because provisions for class action suits, see infra note 26, or for punitive, exemplary
or treble damages, see supra note 16, are rare, the only means of private suit by a number of
victims isjoinder within national courts, a costly and cumbersome procedure. An example
is the consolidation of cases in France relating to a harmful cosmetic under the name Talc
Morange. See also supra notes 11-14.
18 In Sweden, the Market Court works closely with the ombud in policy issues. It has
the power to enjoin marketing practices and to impose penalties and may grant interim
injunctions and restraining orders pending court resolution of legal issues. Its decisions,
which are final and without appeal, serve as precedent in other courts. See KONSU-
MENTOMBUDSMANNEN, REPORT TO OECD CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMMITrEE, Feb. 22, 1973
[hereinafter cited as KONSUMENTOMBUDSMANNEN]; CONSUMER PROTECTION IN SWEDEN (un-
dated pamphlet from Swedish National Board for Consumer Policies [hereinafter cited as
CONSUMER PROTECTION].
For a description of a consumer arbitration board for the Belgian dry-cleaning sector
established by agreement of industry and consumer representative, without government
initiative, see BEUC NEWS, Mar. 1985, at 9. See also supra notes 4-5.
19 The basic premise of the civil law giving rise to a criminal lawsuit is that he who
hurts another directly or indirectly is responsible for his act. It is therefore logical to per-
mit one court to judge both the civil and criminal consequences of the same acts and
responsibilities. Trials are to a judge except in certain criminal cases where a jury may sit
on the liability issue.
In Germany, for example, a private action for recovery of the value of property may be
joined in a criminal case for conversion or damage to material interests. Civil recovery is
permitted only if conviction results from the criminal case. Fisch, European Analogues to the
Class Action: Group Action in France and Germany, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 51, 75 (1979). In France
it has recently been held that there can be no civil recovery in such a "piggy-back" action
unless the criminal verdict is upheld. See Action Civile: des Nuages . CONSOMMATEURS
ACTUALITE, Feb. 1985, at 1.
It has been suggested that de-criminalization of consumer cases is in the consumer's
interest as it would meet the goals of consumer protection, and, in addition, remove a
barrier to negotiation of settlements, when recognition of civil liability would be self-in-
criminating.
To the extent that a fine is penal, it is not tax deductible to a business. Compared to
civil damages, therefore, criminal fines are automatically "double" in cost; see supra note
16. In Germany, the Federal Financial Court allowed tax deductibility of fines for eco-
nomic crimes (e.g., antitrust), but the government is preparing to reverse this by law. Ad-
dress by N. Reich to European Consumer Law Group (Mar. 19, 1984).
20 Social insurances in Europe generally include: (1) unemployment; (2) old age;
(3) dependent children; (4) medical care, covering costs of doctors, hospitals, and
medicines. They are generally obligatory and cover the unemployed as well as the em-
ployed. See supra note 21 for a discussion of available criminal actions.
21 The principle that liability cannot be excluded or limited appears in article 12 of
the EEC Product Liability Directive, snpra note 2. Disclaimers of liability by producers are
therefire denied effect as to private consumer injuries. Disclaimers, warnings, and limita-
tion clauses, however, may define what is improper use (making the victim co-responsible),
may remain effective as to purchases for commercial or professional use, and may limit or
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atively prescribing labeling, make-good, or reimbursement;22
7. Collective remedies on behalf of an affected class either
through public interventions, 23 such as product recall 2 4 or desig-
avoid claims for punitive damages as well as any fines or criminal responsibility. See also
supra notes 11-13.
22 The BEUC (European Office of Consumer Associations) has suggested that the
principle of the free circulation of goods does not preempt the requirement of fairly stat-
ing the quality or comparative ingredients of one product (imported) against another (do-
mestic). See THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE ON FOOD LABELING, BEUC Document
92/82, July 1982, at 11, for a discussion of the wide variance of supplemental national
rules. This book also surveys prior national requirements and lists all specific "vertical"
directives. See supra note I 1 for a discussion of the provisions of the EEC Food Labeling
Directive; see infra note 24 for the individual government's limited right to order recall
under national law. See also Door-to-Door Sales, supra note 12, at 1 (new German law).
23 As of 1984, no EEC country had established a consumer ministry. Consumer
questions in the EEC countries are handled by various other ministries, inter alia, the Min-
istry of Economics (the Netherlands, France); Ministry of Trade (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg); Ministry ofJustice (Germany); and by the Under Secretariat for Corporate
and Consumer Affairs (United Kingdom). Consumer departments exist in Britain and
France and may exist in Greece, but do not have ministerial rank. Other countries in the
EEC have lower level offices to handle consumer questions.
In Sweden, the Public Complaints Board is an independent body organized in ten
sections, each with a chairman and four to ten members. The chairman is a lawyer with
qualifications to serve as judge, and the members are selected from the business and con-
sumer sectors. Its decisions (not subject to appeal) are recommendations for specific cases
based on the regulations. The Board has power to settle disputes between buyers and
sellers at the request of individual consumers, and in case of noncompliance with its rec-
ommendations, may bring suit in the ordinary courts of law by reason of a provision of the
"Act on Simplified Procedure in Small Claims." CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 18.
The Swedish system of courts and boards enforces several laws. The Marketing Act of
1976 prohibits practices that are undesirable or contrary to normal business practices.
The Act requires the provision of adequate information to plaintiffs seeking prohibition of
the sale of harmful goods, and the burden of proof is on the seller to defend its position.
See supra note 18 for further discussion of the Marketing Act.
Similarly, the Danish Consumer Complaints Board Act, No. 305 of June 14, 1974,
creates a board to handle consumer complaints within guidelines provided by the Minister
of Commerce. The Minister of Commerce determines procedures for the Board and ap-
points the members of the Board. The Board may act on its own initiative or can bring a
case before the courts at the request and on behalf of an individual. A complaint by the
Board can be made if (1) it complies with the provisions of the Danish Administration of
Justice Act, Danish Consumer Complaints Board Act, No. 305 ofJune 14, 1974, § 4, and
(2) the defendant can be sued in Danish courts. Id. § 6. A decision by the Board on a
complaint suspends all court or other actions related to a matter. Id. § 8.
The French law ofJuly 21, 1983 (effective 1985) establishes a Consumer Safety Com-
mittee. The members have apparent authority to investigate, but are all state appointees
representing different sectors. BEUC NEws LEGAL SUPP., July 1984, at 1.
The Department of Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom has power to ban
products. It was responsible for removing from the market an unsafe retardant as well as
certain toys filled with polluted water. See supra note 11.
Several EEC countries have adopted an ombud system to deal with consumer issues.
The United Kingdom has an ombud with limited power of initiation of action. See THE
ECONOMIST Feb. 8, 1986, at 29. While Belgium does not have an ombud system, several
Belgian towns have named local ombuds on an experimental basis. This is interesting as it
is one of the first non-Scandinavian uses of the system. Scott, Ombudsman for Angry Con-
sumer, THE BULLETIN, Dec. 1984 at 20.
The need for full national legislative support for an effective consumer program is
indicated by the broad functions and powers ofombuds in Scandinavia. In Sweden, these
include assuring fairness to consumers in advertising, marketing practices, and standard
(adhesion) contracts by means of access of the ombud to civil courts, the power to request
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nated rights to intervene, or recovery of the damage to the public;
2 5
8. "Class actions" brought by any private party on behalf of a
class but for damages limited to those of the complainants;
2 6
injunctions (sanctioned by fines and penalties), and the power to make complaints either
in the Market Court or in the criminal courts. The ombud also may affect the development
of consumer law in his role as Chairman of the Governing Council of the National Board
for Common Policies. See KONSUMENTOMBUDSMANNEN, supra note 18; CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION, supra note 18. In addition to the national ombuds, Sweden has local consumer
councils or authorities that advise consumers as to their legal rights, pass complaints to the
National Board for Consumer Policies or to the Public Complaints Board, maintain con-
tact with the National Board for Consumer Policies (created on July 1, 1976), and work
with popular movements for consumer rights. See id.
In Denmark, the role of the ombud is more limited. The ombud is charged with en-
suring compliance with the standards of the Marketing Practices Act, No. 297 ofJune 14,
1974, but may only refer matters to the Danish court system for decision. His role, there-
fore, is less than that of the Norwegian and Swedish ombuds whose roles may be com-
pared to that of a "regulatory agency" (e.g., FTC or FDA) in U.S. practice.
In Norway, there are two ombuds, one responsible for consumer complaints against
business, and the other for claims against the state and its functionaries.
24 The rights of governments to force recall of products other than food, drugs, and
cosmetics are very limited. None of the EEC initiatives would create any such government
rights. See Product Recall in the European Community, BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 1982, at 2.
Some recall may be effected by "de-licensing" a product for sale where a license is re-
quired (e.g., foods, pharmaceuticals). Recall is increasingly favored by governments (e.g.,
the proposed French consumer law discussed infra note 26), and a directive may be pro-
posed soon.
The stigma of voluntary recall, and the risks that it would lead to additional spurious
claims, is cited as a reason for quiet private settlement. The claims made in the United
States in the "Toxic Shock Syndrome" cases further reinforce opinion against recall.
Moreover, the question of effective recall after secondary levelforeign sales, even within the
EEC, is an unresolved problem that no one appears eager to take up. Recall in the country
of production would not, therefore, affect recall elsewhere because there is no "reverse"
Cassis de Dijon rule. See infra notes 23, 66-67. As to "de-licensing" of products as a means
of progressive recall, see supra note 23 for the description of Belgian practice. See also
OECD, RECALL PROCEDURES FOR UNSAFE PRODUCTS SOLD TO THE PUBLIC (1981). For a
recent review of U.S. practice, see Recalls: Legal and Corporate Responses to FDA, CPSC,
NHTSA, and Product Liability Considerations, 39 Bus. LAW. 757 (1984).
25 The "damage to the public" includes the cost of social transfer payments and loss
of economic activity.
26 The European Consumer Law Group (E.C.L.G.), infra note 42, provides some defi-
nitions of terms:
A class action is an action where one or more members of a group or organiza-
tion further the interests of the entire group in initiating proceedings.
A general interest action is one where the interest furthered or protected is a
general interest as opposed to a specific interest of the plaintiff or of mem-
bers of the group.
BEUC, REPORT ON GROUP ACTIONS, E.C.L.G., (Aug. 1982). See Stuyck, The ECLG Report on
Group Actions-A Comment, 6J. CONSUMER POL'Y 351 (1983).
An explanation of the failure of Europe to provide for class actions has been drawn
from the concept that "collective interests" or "general interests" are public interests to be
dealt with by public, not private action. Thus, an individual or a group of individuals lacks
legal standing to act on behalf of the public or the state, and true class actions (suits on
behalf of an affected class of victims) do not exist in Europe.
Pursuant to the EEC Preliminary Programme for a Consumer Protection and Informa-
tion Policy, supra note 3, the EEC has proposed several directives which would permit
general interest actions at law in the following areas: (1) consumer credit, (2) standard
terms in contract, and (3) misleading and unfair advertising. See supra note 12.
As to class actions and public interest lawsuits under national law, see Collective Litiga-
tion, BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 1982, at 2. The note discusses the problem of standing to
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9. "Punitive damages" awarded by the state as a designated
collective intervenor or to theprivate representative of a class (for
example, a consumer group)27
The third approach addresses procedural questions of liability:
1. Which judicial or administrative forum or body is compe-
tent and can take jurisdiction over all necessary parties; 28
2. Who may assert responsibility;
29
3. Who are the parties responsible at law;
30
sue by consumer groups, either by interpretation or legislation. The national legislation
of the EEC countries is summarized. See the update in BEUC NEWS LEGAL SUPP., Mar.
1985, at 10, and the review of the proposed new French consumer law with "general inter-
est" and class actions in Proposals for a New Consumer Code in France, BEUC NEWS LEGAL
Supp., Nov./Dec. 1985.
For example, "collective interest" suits under French law afford injunctive and collec-
tive damage relief, but:
I. The group must exist before the incident (e.g., tourist groups unlike
the typical U.S. class action);
2. The group must decide by a majority or consensus to take action
(unlike U.S. judicial certification);
3. No individual may act alone for an organization or force an organi-
zation to sue or to represent him (unlike a U.S. class and unlike the rights of
an ombud);
4. Each party must appear in all pleadings and procedures; and
5. Any third party seeking damages from the same conduct must prove
fault.
Fisch, supra note 19, at 67-69.
The only liberalization of these requirements is for class actions under the French Law
for the Guidance of Commerce and Crafts, Law No. 73-1193, 1974 J.C.P. III No. 41167.
Article 46 permits an "action civile" or private action as follows:
[Diuly registered associations whose explicit charter object is to defend the
interests of consumers may, if they are approved for that purpose, bring pri-
vate actions before any jurisdiction with respect to acts causing harm directly
or indirectly to the collective interest of consumers.
Id. art. 46. See supra note 18 for a discussion of punitive damages which may be awarded
to some consumer groups in EEC countries.
In Germany, if there is joint interest in the subject matter of similar claims, joinder
may be permitted. Associations may intervene only if (1) the association has a contractual
relation with the individual, and (2) the group itself has an interest in the case, independ-
ent of the members. In Germany, therefore, consumer and environmental organizations
may not represent groups except to sue for injunction, and not damages. Fisch, supra note
19, at 75-76.
As to Italian practice under article 2601 of the Italian Civil Code, see also BEUC LEGAL
NEws, Sept. 1983, at 10 (dealing with true collective suits, not public or class actions).
The Netherlands gives a special legal status to consumer organizations. Belgium re-
quires statutory recognition of the representative role of an organization before it may
represent the "collective" interest of consumers.
27 See supra notes 16, 19 for a description of available criminal penalties as well as
punitive damages.
28 See supra notes 18, 23 for a discussion of available fora in EEC member nations.
See also supra note 11.
29 See supra notes 23, 26.
30 Article 3 of the EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, puts liability for
product-caused injury and damage on the "producer," not the seller. It then extends such
liabilities to importers, brand name and trademark (but not patent) licensors, and, in cer-
tain cases, to resellers.
Successive parties in trade may be liable under French law for different faults (defec-
tive product, negligent installations, unintended use). A case in Rouen (lere Chambre
Civile) held the manufacturer, the seller, and the user liable in different degrees for the
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4. What are the time limits for claims;
3 1
5. What are the defenses, burdens, and manner of proof.
3 2
The final approach, like the first, combines jurisdictional ele-
ments and substantive empirical circumstances in which consumers
increasingly have rights to protection:
1. Product safety;
33
2. Reliance on assumed fitness or quality;
3 4
3. Exaggerated promises that cannot readily be verified;
3 5
damages. The manufacturer's liability can therefore be lessened by "contributory" negli-
gence on the part of the seller or user. See BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 1984, at 11; see infra
note 93. A provider of false information, even if not a seller, may be liable under chapter 5,
§§ I and 10 of Finland's Consumer Protection Act, Act 38, promulgated Jan. 20, 1978.
The Proposal for a Council Regulation on Community Trade Marks COM (80) 635
Final 2 (Nov. 27, 1980) provides in article 21: "The proprietor of a Community trade mark
shall ensure that the quality of the goods manufactured or of the services provided by the
licensee is the same as that of the goods manufactured or of the services provided by the
proprietor." See also Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 II1. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 314 (1972).
Article 3.1 of the EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, makes the licensor of a
commercial trademark or brandname liable to the same extent as a producer. No proof of
reliance or knowledge of the reputation of the mark or brand is required of the plaintiff. It
is interesting, and inexplicable, that no similar liability is imposed on licensors of patent
rights; even if the patent is the source of the safety defect, as in pharmaceutical cases.
European law has been slow to hold licensors liable for defects in products manufac-
tured by their licensees. See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 967 (reliance on families of brands)
(e.g., Scotch of 3M Corporation). See also supra notes 8, 14 as to who can be held liable.
31 The statutes of limitations for suit or complaint are partly a matter of national law,
and will remain so even after adoption of implementing legislation under the EEC Product
Liability and other directives. The EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 10,
does not supersede national laws that toll the period of prescription (statute of limitations)
beyond three years after the victim's "reasonable awareness" of the particular damage,
defect, and producer identity. Article 11 sets a limit on suit against the producer 10 years
after "putting products in circulations," apparently without regard to national "tolling" stat-
utes. Article 11 appears also to bar suit against other defendants assimilated to producers
by article 3.
The start of the period for suit for product liability is also a matter of national law.
The dispute turns on the applicability of the time of manufacture, the time of sale (whether
at each level of sale or only the first or last sale), the time of use, the time of injury, and the
time of discovery of the injury and/or of the possible cause. The difference is particularly
relevant in cases of deferred damage or damage of indirect causality, with difficult proof
such as genetic defects, cancer, or asbestosis.
32 Under German law, even if damage was caused by the intentional misuse of the
product by the plaintiff, the court will not shift to the defendant the burden of proof on
product defect. BundesgerichtshofVIZR 62/80 7.781 (cited in BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Sept.
1984, at 12).
See infra notes 97, 99 and accompanying text for the burdens of proof that will be
established by implementing legislation under the EEC Product Liability Directive, supra
note 2, arts. 4, 7, 8.
33 See supra note 11.
34 See supra notes 11, 12, 14.
35 According to private communications from the BEUC, there have been few com-
plaints in Europe relating to unsolicited goods. See the summary in BEUC NEWS, Nov.
1983, at 2. See also BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 1983, at 5, for the extension of the reflec-
tion time right in the 1983 Luxembourg consumer protection law; OECD, MAIL ORDER
TRADING AND OTHER SELECTED DISTANT SELLING METHODS (1978); Never, Never, THE BUL-
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4. Insufficient or false information (including prices);3 6
5. Come-ons, advertising, promotions;
3 7
6. Warranties offered (or imposed) as to goods and services;3 8
7. Responsibilities imposed for damage or injury;3 9
8. Fairness of contract terms.
4 0
II. Consumer Protection
A. National Approaches
Although consumers, legislatures, and administrative or execu-
tive authorities have frequently disagreed about national needs for
consumer protection, there have been encouraging developments in
Europe. The United Kingdom regulated door-to-door financial serv-
ices, sales, and tour promotions after several scandals involving
these businesses. 41 Several countries have adopted consumer pro-
tection laws. 4 2 Many countries, particularly those in Scandinavia,
LETIN, Feb. 1985. For a discussion of pricing deception protections for consumers, see
supra note 12.
36 See supra notes 11-12, 35.
37 See id.
38 See supra notes 12-14,
39 See supra notes 11, 12, 14, 16, 19.
40 See supra notes 12, 14, 35.
41 See supra note 12.
42 Within the EEC, the right of consumers to relief against foreign suppliers of goods
and services is aided by two EEC conventions (Brussels Conventions):
(1) Sept. 27, 1968 'Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" providing for the immediate
execution elsewhere in the EEC of judgments rendered in one Member
State; and
(2) Oct. 9, 1978 Convention on the right of a resident of one Member
State to bring suit at his domicile against a resident of another Member State
(O.J. L 304/77, Oct. 30, 1978).
A list of consumer protection laws of major OECD countries follows. Among the principal
architects of consumer policy and protection in Europe are the "European Consumer Law
Group," an ad hoc group of legal experts with a secretariat at the BEUC (European Office
of Consumer Unions) in Brussels, and the BEUC itself.
Consumer Protection Laws
1. Belgium: Trade Practices Act 1971.
2. Denmark: Marketing Practices Act (June 14, 1974).
3. Finland: Consumer Protection Act (Act 38); Consumer-Ombudsman Act, both
promulgated Jan. 20, 1978.
4. France: Law of July 21, 1983 on consumer safety establishing consumer safety
committee. See BEUC NEWS, Dec. 26, 1983; BEUC NEWS LEGAL SuPP., July 1985. See
supra note 26 as to the proposed French consolidated consumer code.
5. Germany: Law on the Regulation of General Conditions of Sale (1976).
6. Ireland: Consumer Information Act of 1978; Sale of Goods and Supply of Serv-
ices Act of 1980.
7. Italy: Fair Trading Act of 1971.
8. Luxembourg: Consumer Protection Law of Aug. 25, 1983. See BEUC LEGAL
NEWS, Sept. 1983, at 1.
9. Norway: The Product Control Act of June 11, 1976, amended June 3, 1977.
10. United Kingdom: The Supply of Goods and Services Act of 1982. See BEUC
NEWS (1983). See also EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW (T. Bourgoignie ed. 1982); BEUC NEWS,
Apr./May 1985 (summary of action taken and pending); European Consumer Law Group.
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have adopted laws relating to specific consumer protection issues.
Other countries have given governmental or semi-governmental
bodies a broad consumer protection mandate.43
The primary focus of European legal development in the con-
sumer protection area has been protection of the public rather than
indemnification of victims. Pecuniary relief is largely regarded as the
domain of insurance. Although punitive controls are necessary, in
the European view, protective regulations are more valuable than
those that censure.
Another encouraging trend for industry is that cost-to-benefit
analysis is a principle which regulatory authorities in some countries
must consider in imposing consumer protection controls.44 This
principle will probably be endorsed in future European Economic
Community (EEC) rule making proposals as it presently is in EEC
regulation of pharmaceuticals and environmental issues. The Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
also advocates use of cost analysis in designing consumer protection
and industrial controls.
The practices that have recently been addressed by both na-
tional and multilateral laws fall into three basic categories:
1. Sales practices; 45
2. Normalization, standardization and labeling;
4 6
Non-Legislative Means of Consumer Protection, 6 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 209 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Non-Legislative Means].
43 See supra note 23.
44 See OECD, PRODUCT SAFETY: RISK MANAGEMENT AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
(1983). The principle of cost-benefit analysis can be abused. It is clear, however, that a
request for a cost-benefit analysis is a proper ground for deferring action on a directive. A
recent example was the Italian request in 1984 for a cost-benefit analysis of the entire EEC
Draft Directive on Product Liability. It is unclear whether such analysis was in the interest
of the consumer and would provide a more solid backing for the adoption of national
legislation conforming to the Directive. The principle of unanimity, that the EEC must
justify to each member the grounds necessary for national adoption of a directive, appears
clear. See BEUC NEWS, Feb. 1984, at I.
45 See supra notes 12, 13, 23, 35.
46 The consumer protection and product liability fields have been particularly diffi-
cult to "harmonize" because of well-developed laws in several countries. See supra note 42.
Consumer recourse and remedies under EEC law are summarized in BEUC LEGAL NEWS,
Dec. 1983, at 6. See Memorandum on the Approximation of the Laws of M'Iember States Relating to
Product Liability, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE 145 (1975). In the absence of a possibility
of true harmonization, the result has been: (1) delay on the Dangerous Toy Directive (now
expected soon) and slow progress on the Product Liability Directive; (2) a failure to act on
the asbestos issue; (3) ineffective measures; and (4) directives which add a layer of recourse
without harmonizing national law, and ultimately diverse new national measures. See supra
notes 8, 11.
When the EEC makes new law, there is no method for harmonizing the development
of jurisprudence except as to those issues which have been preempted by the new law.
The absence of interpretive aids tends to expedite the diversity of jurisprudence rather
than formulate coherent, unified new law. See the express disclaimer of preemption in the
commentary to the EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2. The non-preemptive
principle appears in the preamble and in article 13.
The EEC has considered adoption of directives based on standards accepted by indus-
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3. Warranties and product liability.4 7
B. Sales Practices
Various national standards exist without a clear pattern. One
type of regulation generally addresses the relationship between sales
practice and contractual liability in claims based upon deceptive or
exaggerated advertising and marketing. 48 The principle of "fair-
ness" is also enshrined in most of the European consumer protec-
tion laws.4 9
In keeping with the European preference for using governmen-
tal intervention rather than private litigation to enforce consumer
protection, damage to any one consumer does not generally consti-
tute grounds for legal action, and collective or class actions are rarely
allowed. Class action relief is very uncommon in Europe except
through joinder of related cases, and in France, through collective
consumer group actions for exemplary damages.
50
try. This procedure, favored by Commissioner Narjes, was too close to the support of
industry positions for some of his staff. However, after the repeated failure of the EEC
Council to adopt specific EEC standards, it has become the major current EEC harmoniza-
tion initiative.
At the end ofJanuary 1985, the Commission issued a Communication setting
out its views on reducing the harmonization of technical laws. Henceforth it
would lay down only "essential safety requirements or other requirements of
common concern" in Directives, and would entrust the drawing up of techni-
cal standards to the European standardization bodies (CEN, GENELEC); as a
transitional measure, it would even accept national standards.
BEUC NEWS, June 1985, at 2. See also BEUC NEWS, Feb. 1985, at 3; EEC Deregulation, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 1985, at 62. See also EEC Technical Standards Directive
83/189/EEC, supra note 11, establishing an information procedure in the field of technical
standards and rules. See Non-Legislative Means, supra note 42, for a discussion of the his-
tory, types, and experience with industry codes from the points of view of the self-regulat-
ing trades and consumers.
In Belgium and the Netherlands, collective agreements between consumer and pro-
ducer groups may create arbitral commissions (bi-partite, or with government representa-
tion). Sales contracts then provide for intervention of the commission in cases of dispute.
See the description of Belgian agreements between producer and consumer groups in
BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 1983, at 2.
The best summary of voluntary codes and bi-partite agreements appears in Report on
Non-Legislative Means of Consumer Protection, European Consumer Law Group, Louvain-la-
Neuve Doc XI/872/82-EN (1982). The proposal of "Voluntary Agreements" under the
EEC's Second Consumer Action Programme, supra note 3, has not aroused much interest.
These codes would be applicable only to the signatories because there is no official partici-
pation in negotiation, monitoring, or sanctions. Nevertheless, in several EEC countries
negotiated bi-partite codes exist between producers or trade organizations and consumer
groups. The subject matter and procedures vary from country to country.
47 See supra notes 2, 12, 13. See generally 4 PRODUCT LIABILITY INTERNATIONAL (J. Ash-
worth ed. 1982); H. TEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY (1979); PRODUCT LIABIL-
ITY IN EUROPE (1975) (reviewing national law); T. Bourgoignie, Where IVe Stand on Product
Liability, BEUC NEWS, Feb. 1984; Whincup, supra note 12.
48 See supra note 2.
49 See supra note 12. Lawyers and courts do not get the chance to debate "fairness" in
Europe because administrative bodies and officials, such as ombuds, rather than judges,
make fairness determinations. See supra note 23.
50 See supra note 26.
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The OECD has been very active in harmonizing and upgrading
national standards in the sales practices area. The OECD has sug-
gested sales practices standards in the following areas: 5 1
1. Rules on mail order an door-to-door sales and "Tup-
perware" and "Avon" sales promotion parties; 52
2. Sales of insurance, financial and other services door-to-
door or by telephone appointment; 5 3
3. Deceptive financing or description of total costs, such as
"no payment until September," "interest free," and "only thirty-
eight dollars" (for each of three months);
4. Incentives or "stamp" promotions through free coupons,
toys or trinkets, rebate, or cash refund tickets, which are increasingly
being banned in Europe; 54
5. Unsolicited and mail-order goods which are already well
controlled; 55
6. Unfair contract clauses (unreasonably strict or costly condi-
tions for obtaining benefit of warranty). 56
These standards may frustrate some consumer marketing schemes
embracing all of Europe.
C. Disclosure and Labeling
Requirements for disclosure are counterparts to unfair sales
practices. 5 7 Consumer protection laws increasingly impose two sets
of requirements on labeling and on product ingredients. The first
type involves specific labeling standards requiring symbols for poi-
sonous, flammable, corrosive, or temperature sensitive materials and
designation of the ingredients, additives, colorants, preservatives,
and shelf life of foods, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals. The second
type of regulations require general rules of fair presentation, like
naming a product non-deceptively (for example, not naming cookies
made with vegetable oil "Buttercups"). 58
Specific standards are being adopted throughout Europe
because of the harmonizing efforts of the OECD, including Scandi-
navia. The EEC has also encouraged uniformity in the food,
pharmaceuticals, additives, and chemical areas under its Treaty of
Rome article 100 powers. 59
51 The OECD includes all of western Europe except the smaller states (Liechtenstein,
Monaco, San Marino, Vatican, Andorra, Malta and Cyprus). The members are Iceland,
Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland,
Austria, Ireland, United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey as well as
the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (EEC members italicized).
52 See supra note 36.
53 See supra note 22.
54 See supra note 12.
55 Id.; see also supra note 35.
56 See supra note 12.
57 See supra note 11.
.5 Id.
59 See supra note 46.
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In contrast, the general rules are to date a matter of national
regulation and OECD recommendation. The road to achieving a
common market for goods and services even within the EEC is not
yet clear. The ghastly mess created by the EEC when they tried to
draft directives for Euro-beer and Euro-pork chops made everyone
reach for a Euro-aspirin.60 As a result, reluctance to create too much
regulatory detail in writing is well established in Europe except in
the food and pharmaceutical product area.6 1
D. Product Safety and Labeling
Each country has had a different legal response to product safety
and labeling, although every country has imposed some standards.
In several countries, industry groups, collaborating with private con-
sumer groups and/or with state councils, have adopted codes and
norms that are generally only binding on member companies. 62
Some codes have been negotiated with government support.
Trade practice codes are rarely detailed. In the critical "FDA"
area, the requirements for labeling are generally set by government
authorities in cooperation with concerned industries or by the OECD
and EEC as part of their multinational efforts. 63 The recent EEC
initiative favoring harmonization of regulation by adopting standards
set privately by industry associations may indicate a move to a more
realistic and successful effort in this area. To date none of these
codes has been extended by decree to have the force of law for all
affected companies, as labor agreements have been extended to
cover entire industrial sectors. Nevertheless, courts rely on codes
and norms that delineate expected trade practices.
E. Disclaimers
Labeling may be designed to meet minimum consumer protec-
tion standards. It may also be a vehicle for eschewing liability by
asserting in fine print that the labeled product has no warranties and
is safe until used. In Europe, attempts to disclaim liability will be
unsuccessful because manufacturers and sellers are strictly liable for
injuries caused by defective products they market. In addition, strict
liability eliminates common law obstacles to a victim's recovery, such
as commercial privity requirements, level (regarding infants, for ex-
ample) or nature (for example, "reasonable man") of standards of
care, and foreseeability of victim or danger. 64 Nonetheless, invalida-
6O Id.
III See supra note 11. This corresponds to the FDA area of jurisdiction in the United
States.
62 See supra note 42 for a sample listing of national legislation.
(' See supra note 1 i.
64 See supra note 5.
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tion of contractual disclaimers and imposition of strict liability for
product related injuries is not onerous for insured businesses be-
cause European judges do not give "bleeding heart" damage awards
as U.S. juries frequently do.6 5
F. Restrictive Trade Practices
The EEC prohibits restrictions on cross-border flow of goods
within the Community.66 The landmark case, Rewe-Zentral AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dion),67 precludes
member states from banning foreign goods that do not meet domes-
tic legal requirements from their markets. Legal action, however,
against other EEC manufacturers may be taken if foreign goods fail
to meet stricter national fair labeling and product quality standards
that are reasonably necessary for consumer protection. 68 In addition,
it is questionable whether Cassis de Dyon can be relied on because the
northern tier EEC members have no intention of letting the three
new Southern members, Portugal, Greece, and Spain, export goods
like toys, made without any appreciable safety standards, to other
markets within the EEC. As a result, more consumer protection liti-
gation concerning permissible product safety and labeling standards
is inevitable. 69
In many countries restrictive or exclusionary trade practices pro-
moted by national industries, such as German producers of "purer"
beer, French sparkling wine producers, and suppliers of services,
such as insurance, continue to masquerade as consumer protection.
Such national "consumer protection" regulations, which the OECD
has regularly resumed, have often run into conflict with the principle
of free movement of goods within the EEC. This issue is far from
resolved despite efforts at agreement on standards. 70
The role of the EEC and the OECD in the consumer protection
regulatory area has been both to push for more strict standards and
to fight for open international markets, providing certain minimum
65 See supra note 14; see also supra note 12 for the availability of legal assistance insur-
ance in Belgium.
(i~i The Treaty of Rome provides for free circulation of goods and for limitations on
this right in the case of protection of public health and safety. Treaty of Rome, supra note
3, arts. 30, 36.
67 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 649, 3 COMM. MKr. L.R. 494. See 23 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 256) 2 (1980): "Any product lawfully produced and marketed in one Member State
must, in principle, be admitted to the market of any other Member State." See the discus-
sion on the application of this rule to the German beer purity law in BEUC NEWS, Sept.
1983, at 3. A general book on the subject is P. OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THIE
EEC (1982). See alto BEUC NEws, Mar. 1985, at 5: The Consmner: 4 Force Against Protection-
ism, OECD OBSERVER, July 1984, at 22; Consumer Redress Under European Competition Law,
BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 1983.
8 See supra note 13.
6(. Id.
70 See, e.g, supra notes 2, 13, 42.
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standards are met.71 Indeed, British manufacturers have pressured
the United Kingdom to adopt broader defenses to conform with the
scope of defenses allowable under the new EEC Product Liability Di-
rective. 72 These manufacturers seek to institute the "development
risk defense" in British law. Article 7(e) of the Directive permits this
defense, but it is not yet part of British jurisprudence. 73
G. Warranties and Product Liability
No attempt is being made to summarize European law on war-
ranties and product liability because the national laws of twenty
countries, most of which are now EEC members, must be studied. 74
There is no OECD law; it is not a law making body. The Council of
Europe has long been silent 75 and the effects of the EEC Directive
are still unclear. Although specific EEC directives do regulate food,
pharmaceuticals, cosmetic ingredients, and dangerous substances,
these directives mainly control labeling and permitted ingredients. 76
The EEC has established some consumer protection regulations
governing the health and safety of food, pharmaceuticals, and other
consumer products, such as cosmetics, clothing, electrical appli-
ances, and to a certain extent, automobiles. The EEC, however, has
only recently established product liability standards. 77 As a result,
national rules have provided more effective product regulation and
probably will continue to do So.78
National laws require manufacturers' warranties for many prod-
ucts. 7 9 Such warranties, and the terminology in which they may and
must be expressed, will probably continue to be governed by na-
tional legislation, even after national legislatures adopt the EEC Di-
rective's principles on warranties and product liability.8 0
The principal contract remedy is enforcement of the parties' ob-
ligations. There is no right to pay for the right to default. Specific
performance is the first right assured by various national consumer
71 See supra notes 24, 46, 66.
72 See supra note 1.
73 The European Parliament took the "development risk" exclusion out of the EEC
Commission's original proposal for a Product Liability Directive, supra note 2. In the final
compromise text, the exclusion has been reincluded at the request of Britain as an option
available under national implementing legislation. The exclusion may be revised or elimi-
nated after 10 years (in 1995) pursuant to article 15.3 of the Directive.
74 See generally supra notes 2, 47. National laws vary from very severe (France, Ger-
many, United Kingdom, and Scandinavia) to practically non-existent (Greece, Spain, and
Portugal) according to the EEC Commission. This disparity in national product liability
laws has made harmonization difficult.
75 The Council of Europe dealt only with abusive contract clauses. Res. 78(3), adopted
'Jan. 20, 1978. It has no appreciable legal effect.
76 See supra note 11.
77 EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2.
78 See supra note 9.
7) See supra note 12.
"o See supra note 14.
1986]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
protection statutes. A buyer has the right to replace or repair defec-
tive merchandise, or if the defect is not remediable, the option of
reimbursement for the difference in value. The EEC is not working
on these consumer product rights that remain the subject of national
law.8 1
Manufacturers of automobiles, appliances and consumer
durables now offer "peace of mind" contracts for an extended war-
ranty to obtain payment for the warranty services required by na-
tional laws. 82 These contracts also establish the warranty's scope
and put the occasional "lemon" into a pooled insurance risk for all
buyers. Little attention has been directed to the possible abusive as-
pects of obligatory service contracts-use of the contracts to shift
warranty costs to the consumer.
H. Means of Recourse
The legal structure of bodies charged with the development,
promulgation, and enforcement of consumer regulations varies
widely from one country to another. Consumer departments or min-
istries exist in several countries. Their authority to stop sales of
goods, to order recalls to make good, or to reimburse, and their civil
and criminal prosecution powers vary widely. 83 In Scandinavia, the
ombud, an "official conscience" with investigative, subpoena, and in-
junctive powers has been the chosen means of consumer protection.
The ombud institution 4 appears unlikely to spread, however, de-
spite its success and effectiveness in Scandinavia. Consumer councils
work well in Britain and Denmark but have failed to excite the conti-
nent to action.8 5 Although market courts adjudicate disputes be-
tween merchants and consumers in several countries, these courts
only have "small claims" jurisdiction. 86
The importance and effectiveness of European institutions regu-
lating consumer protection may be difficult for U.S. trained lawyers
to appreciate. Most European countries have not chosen to use pri-
vate litigation as an arm of public policy. Instead, most European
governments have become more directly involved in regulating con-
sumer protection through consumer ministries, ombuds, consumer
councils, and prohibiting sale of dangerous products. In addition,
private litigation is not effective as an immediate remedy for injury
because the civil law system places parties in the position they ex-
pected to be in before suffering injury.8 7 Even when civil law permits
81 See supra note 2.
82 See supra note 13.
8 3 See, e.g., supra notes 18, 23, 24.
84 See supra note 23.
85 See id.
" See supra note 18.
87 See generalv supra note 1 I.
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joinder of a civil complaint to a criminal complaint, the complainant
only receives compensation for his damages; any criminal penalties
are still paid to the state. 88 Consequently, many disputes are not
litigated. Less litigation also means far heavier social charges on em-
ployers and employees taking the place of a large part of the manu-
facturers' insurance burden to pay medical costs of victims of
product accidents.89
I. Law of Product Liability
Manufacturers and sellers are generally strictly liable for injuries
arising through imperceptible defects in a product during its normal,
intended use.90 Strict liability cannot be limited by contract or dis-
claimer. The burden of proof of product defect and injury, however,
remains on the victim.9 1 The U.S. legal concepts of negligence, as-
sumpsit, reasonable care, the common man, and poor old Palsgraf9 2
are of little relevance in Europe. Because the civil law governs all
commerce and its consequences, single cases cannot be analyzed in
terms of the distinctions between contract and tort, and between de-
sign defect and failure. The civil law contains the comparative negli-
gence principle generally found in the one form of civil law used in
common law jurisdictions: admiralty law. 93  Comparative negli-
gence, which may be called pro rata causality or responsibility, is a
method of allocating damage recovery. Because the EEC Directive
88 See generally supra note 19.
89 See supra notes 12, 20.
90 See supra note 8.
91 See supra note 14.
92 Palsgraf v. New York Cent. Ry. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), established
that the contributory negligence of a plaintiff-victim in tort did not bar recovery of his
damages caused by the fault of a third party. This is also the rule in civil law, which is
closer to the admiralty rule of proportional fault or comparative negligence. See article 8
of the recent EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, which provides for comparative
negligence (inappropriately called contributory negligence) as a basis for reduction or lim-
itation of recovery, contrary to the general principle ofjoint and several liability in article
5.
9.3 The term "contributory negligence" was added to the draft EEC Product Liability
Directive by the European Parliament. Its intention, however, was not to bar a recovery by
negligent victims, but to measure the relative contribution of their fault to the damages.
The correct term is probably comparative negligence, a principle well-founded in the civil
law and also known in U.S. admiralty. The Directive purports to create strict liability so
the term "comparative negligence" is avoided, even if the concept remains. Article 3 of
the 1979 draft (OJ. No. C/271/87 of Oct. 1979) provides that two persons who are liable
are "liable jointly and severally, each person retaining the right to compensation from the
other"-a mix of rights of contribution and contributory, negligence. Article 6 of the final
text leaves the right of compensation to chance and forum shopping by providing that
each person is "liable jointly and severally without prejudice to the provisions of national
law concerning the rights of contribution or recourse." EEC Product Liability Directive,
supra note 2, art. 6. An explanation of dangers posed when comparative negligence is
combined with joint and several liability appears in Granelli, The .. ttark on Joint and Several
Liability, A.B.A. J., July 1985, at 61 (one solvent defendant, even if only one percent re-
sponsible, may be obliged to pay all the damages).
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adopts comparative negligence, 94 the common law doctrine of
"clean hands," with its bar to claims for recovery by contributorily
negligent parties, will not become part of continental law.
Sellers are apparently shielded from liability to injured buyers
only when obvious defects create such injuries. According to the
civil law principle of hidden defect, "vice cache" in French, sellers
are responsible for all hidden defects. 95 In contrast to the origins of
U.S. product liability law,96 manufacturers not in privity with retail-
ers distributing their products are also strictly liable for product-re-
lated injuries. In addition, sellers and manufacturers are generally
jointly liable, but with rights of contribution under the principles of
comparative negligence. The distinction between "joint" and "sev-
eral" liability is one of those fine points of Anglo-Saxon law that has
never crossed the English Channel. Recently, a trend favoring no-
fault product liability has developed, which will require establish-
ment of a collective fund or insurance plan.
9 7
The civil law system also holds bailors, lessors, and free sample
suppliers liable for product-related injuries.98 In addition, the re-
cent EEC Directive makes importers into the EEC liable to the same
extent as EEC manufacturers. 99 It is impossible to predict whether
94 See supra notes 92 and 93.
95 See supra note 5.
96 See supra note 4 for the RESTATEMENT law on products liability.
97 The EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, leaves to national law both the
definition of the causal relationship under the EEC cause of action, and the determination
whether the victim will have any other causes of action. Because it is unclear whether the
EEC cause of action is based on strict liability (as stated in the preamble) or on fault (de-
fect and causation as stated in articles 4 and 6), it is unclear whether negligence would
have any effect on the initial determination of liability, on the determination of compara-
tive and contributory liability under article 8, or on the amount of damages (unless puni-
tive damages are allowed).
Generally, in Europe as in the United States, serious fault or "gross negligence" (dol
in French) will increase civil responsibility, partially excuse contributory negligence, and
may create criminal as well as civil liability. See supra note 19. The interaction of these
principles with the EEC cause of action will require judicial clarification.
98 In Europe, the extension of liability from sellers and manufacturers to lessors, bail-
ors, and suppliers of free samples has not been marked with the difficulties encountered in
the United States. Originally, the U.S. courts relied on a need for contractual privity, and
more recently, on a relation under the U.C.C. See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 962. for a
description of the U.S. use of the "stream of commerce" theory to expand liability to
suppliers of goods other than sellers.
The EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, despite its reference to "entry into
circulation," is a producers liability law. As to other parties in the stream of commerce, the
Directive is more ambiguous to the extent that article 3.2 imposes liability on lessors and
perhaps on suppliers of free samples (article 7(c)), but probably not on bailors, or even on
retailers who have reason to know of the defect. The Directive may therefore block the
progress of EEC law towards extended consumer rights by creating a rabbit-warren of
illogical distinctions.
99 The EEC Product Liability Directive imposes liability on an EEC importer in lieu of
the producer, even if the producer is present. See EEC Product Liability Directive, supra
note 2, art. 3.2. It is not clear whether an importer standing in the position of the pro-
ducer can use defenses available to a producer to avoid liability. If such defenses are tin-
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the Community will adopt the U.S. legal principle of liability for
"composite business enterprises."'' 0 0 Each European country has
addressed this problem by providing different liability limitations
and exclusions. The developing U.S. law of licensor liability,' 0 ' ex-
emplified by Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co. 102 and Connelly v. Uniroyal,
Inc.,103 has not been followed in Europe. The Hercules and Uniroyal
courts imposed strict liability on trademark licensors based on im-
plied duties rising from quasi-tort and quasi-contract principles.
This sort of judicial extrapolation is very uncommon in civil law
countries; European laws of liability explicitly hold manufacturers
and sellers strictly liable for injuries caused by their products. New
consumer protection laws, however, impose liability on licensors
when consumers have relied to their detriment on the purported
quality of a product. In addition, article 3.2 of the EEC Product Lia-
bility Directive imposes liability on trademark licensors for defective
products without regard to consumer reliance on the mark.' 0 4
Although negligence has not been discussed, fault and serious
fault are factors that increase liability in the civil law system. Because
fault implies knowledge, it also heightens the responsible party's lia-
bility for injury. 105 Because criminal penalties are often imposed on
parties for fault, additional liability frequently results in fines paid to
the state rather than a windfall for the victim. The EEC Directive will
not preempt civil or criminal liability for negligence. As a result,
businesses will need to insure both their officers and products and
negotiate for tax deductibility of product liability insurance premi-
ums and payments. 10 6 Consequently, products' liabilities are often
of more concern to insurance advisors than legal counsel.
The social welfare net, which in most European countries in-
cludes free medicine, doctors, hospital care and state paid benefits
during illness or incapacity, has put on the state the economic bur-
den of proving medical expenses and earnings lost by persons in-
jured by defective products. 10 7 Civil damage suits and insurance
available, however, the right of contribution and recourse found in article 5 makes no
sense.
100 U.S. laws have tended towards the creation of a theory of "group" responsibility
for legal obligations related to export controls, boycotts, corrupt practices, tax (unitary
tax), obligations to employees and unions, etc. It is not clear whether this trend might be
relied upon by a European court to find a U.S. parent organization liable for acts of a
subsidiary or affiliate.
1l See Goldstein, supra note 6. For a recent review of U.S. law, see Poms and
Merkadeau, Product Liability of Trademark Licensor, LES NOUVELLES, Mar. 1986, at 32.
1 '2 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
10:3 75 11. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980).
104 See supra note 30.
105 See supra note 97.
106 See supra note 19.
107 The rapid rise of insurance rates in the United States in the 1970s was due to (I) an
increase in the number of persons liable; (2) a decrease in the types of defenses allowed;
(3) increased awards of punitive damages; (4) an extension of' statutes of limitations;
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relate principally to pain and suffering damages, and exemplary
damages when and if they are permitted.' 0 8 Double, treble, and pu-
nitive damages are generally not available in Europe.109 In addition,
attorneys' contingent fees are illegal in most of Europe.1 0 As a re-
sult, insurance claim settlements are a fraction of the inflated capital-
ized payments that are made in the United States. The injured
European party will, therefore, often settle rapidly to receive his real
damages, excluding state insured costs.II Any penalties recovered
may go to the state and are separately negotiated by the responsible
manufacturer, often without tax relief or availability of insurance if
deduction of penalties or premiums is against public policy." 12
Recovery of "real money," in plaintiff's terms, may be difficult
for European claimants. The civil law enforces the bargain, replace-
ment, or make-good. Loss of profits or loss of a product's economic
use is far more difficult to claim successfully." 3 The buyer should
probably insure himself against such economic losses, and his insur-
ance company can perhaps claim as subrogee. 1"4 The recourse for
economic loss is perhaps best left to the laws governing relations
between merchants, including commercial codes and the United Na-
tions Convention on the International Sale of Goods. In many coun-
tries, jurisdiction of merchant disputes is in special commercial
courts.' 15
A logical way to counterbalance the obligations and costs the
state assumes in compensating product defect or accident victims,
typically on a total no-fault basis," 16 would be to reduce or eliminate
(5) the existence of contingency fee claims; and (6) the absence of the "social net" of state-
paid medical and rehabilitation costs. See supra note 20.
Under the civil law system, the winning party in civil litigation may recover a substan-
tial part of his legal fees from the other party. In Germany, the court determines these
fees according to a schedule fixed by law. In France, the attribution of costs and fees is at
the discretion of the judge. Fisch, supra note 19, at 54-56. In these countries, legal aid
(state-paid counsel) is probably more available to the public than in the United States, and
contingent fees are deemed unethical because they undermine the independence of the
attorney as an officer of the court. Id.
18 See supra notes 11, 16.
109 See supra note 16.
110 See supra note 107.
II1 See generally supra notes 11, 107.
112 A limit of 25 million European units of account (EUAs) was set by article 7 of the
EEC Draft Directive. Article 16 of the Product Liability Directive, as adopted, permits
member states to adopt a 70 million EAU limit for all damages caused by identical articles
with the same defect. The limit in the Directive includes pain and suffering, death, and
injury. No limits are set for property damage. The limit may be revised or eliminated after
10 years pursuant to article 16.2 of the Directive.
The EUA is defined by Financial Regulation 3180/78 of Dec. 1978, OJ. No. L 379/1
of Dec. 30, 1978, as amended by Regulation 2626/84 (247 O.J. of Sept. 16, 1984), at 1. See
also supra note 12,
I II See supra note 14.
114 See supra note 107.
1 15 See supra nole 2.
1 16 See supra note 5.
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tax deductions for product liability payments or for any augmented
risk insurance premiums. These tax reform measures would make
the state, via the tax system, a partner in any recovery of costs of
indemnifying injured persons. There could, of course, be a counter-
productive effect on voluntary make-good and new product develop-
ment if such a rule were adopted. 117 At present, even fines are tax
deductible, although the German government has proposed to
change this practice.
III. European Efforts
A. Consumer Protection
Several European bodies have undertaken efforts to arrive at a
consumer protection program. The Council of Europe proposed a
trade practice code in 1973. In 1977 the Council opened the Stras-
bourg Convention on product liability for signature."18 The Con-
vention, however, is binding only on countries that ratify it. Four
countries have signed the Convention, and none have ratified it.
Prior to adoption of the EEC Directive, prospects for ratification of
the Convention were poor. In view of adoption of the EEC Direc-
tive, it may be considered dead.
Other efforts to formulate a uniform consumer protection pro-
gram have been equally unsuccessful. The Hague Convention of
October 1973119 has four signatories; the 1980 EEC Convention on
Contract Rights has none. United Nations efforts, particularly the
consumer protection guidelines formulated by the UN ECOSOC and
opposed by the United States, only pose a remote threat to manufac-
turers.' 20 United Nations' efforts, however, may incite the OECD to
117 Seesupra note 19.
118 The Strasbourg Convention is the popular name for the European Convention on
Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death,Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No.
91, reprinted in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE 131 (1975). This Convention is highly re-
garded by the BEUC. BEUC NEWS, Feb. 1984, at 1. The Convention does not cover dam-
age to property. Defenses include: (1) latent defects, (2) the placement of goods in
commerce by a party other than the manufacturer, and (3) comparative negligence.
119 The Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, Oct. 2, 1973, 1977
Recueil des Traites et Accords de la France 82, applies to non-contracting states. The
United States could benefit from exemption under the "federal state exception" for a state
that has different territorial units with separate laws. The Convention excludes raw agri-
cultural products and does not set time limitations on enforcement of a victim's rights.
The Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability is reproduced in PRODUCT
LIABILITY IN EUROPE 127 (1975).
120 The United Nations ECOSOC adopted a set of Consumer Protection Guidelines in
July 1983. The aims are like those of other organizations (e.g., the OECD), but the sug-
gested method is exclusively state regulation, so the likely result will be protectionist
measures. 21 UN-CTC REPORTER 56 (Spring 1986).
See, e.g., U.N. Gen. Assembly Res. 37/137 of 1982 on exports of hazardous substances.
A list of products was completed at the end of 1983. See also International Register of
Potentially Toxic Chemicals, prepared by the United Nations Environment Program. This
work has led to guidelines for transport, storage, handling, and disposal. The Food and
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adopt a consumer protection code or encourage revival of the Stras-
bourg or Hague Conventions.
The EEC Commission has no system of white papers, reports, or
public debate to help it draft rules. 121 Although there have been two
EEC declarations establishing a consumer program, 122 the Con-
sumer Protection Directorate (DG XI) has been almost wholly unable
to obtain approval of its proposed directives.123 The EEC DG III has
banned certain toxic substances in foods and cosmetics under its del-
egated trade regulation powers. 124 The DG III, however, has not yet
attempted to exercise its delegated powers outside public health and
safety issues, even for dangerous toys.
The EEC toxic and hazardous substance regulations copy the
OECD information exchange system. Both provide for multilateral
information exchange.' 25 Any action taken against defective prod-
ucts will probably occur at a national level under product licensing
statutes or other legislation because product recall is rare,' 26 and
there is no "anti-Cassis de Do'on" rule to ban everywhere in the EEC
products banned in one nation. 127
Despite the wishes and pronouncements of the EEC Commis-
sioners, the recent trend in the EEC has not been towards a greater
Europeanization of laws created by EEC directives with EEC enforce-
ment (and the vastly increased budget and bureaucracy that would
ensue), but towards harmonization of European laws, by creating
minimum EEC standards.' 2 8 In early 1985, the EEC explicitly en-
dorsed harmonization by adoption of norms formulated by industry.
These harmonization efforts may resolve the riddle posed by the Cas-
sis de Dyon case concerning how to prevent less strictly made South
or East European goods (or goods originating elsewhere) from being
sold in countries with more strict consumer protection laws.
It is likely that increased harmonization will be achieved by col-
lective consent. In this area, the OECD has been more thorough and
imaginative than the EEC.' 2 9 Membership of all major U.S. trading
partners in the OECD and the negative effect of the "Cassis de Dijon"
Agriculture Organization has prepared detailed information on food products, its "Codex
Alimentarius."
121 The Commission occasionally publishes a "white paper" without debate or public
hearings. The Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee do not use hearings or
"exposure drafts."
122 See supra note 2.
123 Even the Product Liability Directive was a product of EEC General Directorate III
(internal markets), an important distinction if one suspects in error that the new Directive
signals the reawakening of the consumer program. See supra note 1.
124 See supra note 11.
125 See id.
126 See supra note 24.
127 See supra note 67.
128 See supra note 46.
12,) See id.
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rule on higher quality, higher priced U.S. goods argues well for in-
creased U.S. support for OECD efforts to curb Euro-protectionism
created by Euro-standards. The United States certainly does not
want the EEC to become anotherJapanese Ministry of Foreign Trade
(MITI).
B. The EEC Product Liability Directive
The EEC Product Liability Directive1 30 ofJuly 25, 1985 will take
effect on July 30, 1988. Each country must adopt national imple-
menting legislation before that date. In view of the ambiguities in
the Directive, it will probably create diversity rather than unity.' 3'
The EEC Product Liability Directive was first proposed in 1976,
and then revised by the European Parliament in 1979. Adoption of
the Directive, however, stalled in the EEC Council of Ministers be-
cause of diversity among existing national laws. Germany's insis-
tence on a monetary limit for all identical articles with the same
defect,132 on defenses for "development risks,"' 3 3 and for "state of
the art products" 3 4 were the principal areas of conflict.
In 1985, resolution of the disputes about a monetary limit,' 3 5
and "state of the art,"' 1 6 and "development risk"' 13 7 exemptions
were postponed until 1995-the Directive permits EEC Member
States to adopt alternative provisions at least until that date.' 38
Although the Directive both supplements and preempts some na-
tional laws, it fails to achieve harmonization.
The Directive is unusual in several respects. First, it is a rare
example of EEC "new law," created without pretense of being har-
monizing law. Second, the Directive creates a private cause of action
under national law. Third, it is poorly and inconsistently drafted,
even by EEC standards. It is not clear what the national laws must
130 See supra note 2. See also L. Kramer, CONSUMER LAW AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(1986).
131 See descriptions of effect on national laws of Italy, Germany, and Denmark in
BEUC NEWS LEGAL SUPP., Mar. 1986, at 13; see also T. Bourgoignie, TheJuly 25, 1985 EEC
Directive on Product Liability, Central de Droit de la Consummation, Univ. Louvain-1-N
(1986) (unpublished position paper).
132 See supra note 112.
133 See suipra note 73.
134 The state of the art defense is included in the EEC Product Liability Directive,
supra note 2, art. 6.2. It is important to note that state of the art in Europe does not mean
"best available technology" as it does in the United States. It means generally accepted
industrial practice at the time of manufacture and initial sale. In a German case,
Bundesgerichtshof, VI ZR 191/79 17.3.81, the plaintiff was held responsible for proving
that warnings on labeling were in compliance with state of the art technology at the time of
the accident. See BEUC LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 1984, at 12. This standard appears stricter
than that set out in article 6.2 of the EEC Product Liability Directive.
135 See EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 16(1); supra note 112.
136 See EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, art. 15(l)(b).
137 Id. art 7(e); see supra note 73.
138 See EEC Product Liability Directive, supra note 2, arts. 15(3), 16(2).
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provide to conform to it. 139 Adopting the Directive in haec verbis into
national law could result in its total or partial invalidation on the
grounds of vagueness and inconsistency. Clearly, the new Directive
will not result in harmonization in the short term. Instead of creat-
ing better protection for consumers, the Directive may initially have
the contrary effect. The "state of the art" and "development risk"
defenses allowed by the Directive are broader than the defenses now
provided by the national laws of several EEC countries. In the
United Kingdom, manufacturers are trying to use the Directive as a
"Restatement of the Law," seeking to conform British law to the less
favorable rights of victims under the Directive.
IV. Conclusion
The Product Liability Directive is only a small improvement in
the product liability and consumer protection fields. Clearly, prod-
uct liability has the greatest public policy justification because it pro-
tects the populace from physical injury and property damage. 140
The other consumer protection fields, protecting against economic
abuses that are often more widespread but less detectable, are
predominantly a state concern as tutor for its citizens.' 4' The United
States should not expect the private cause of action created by the
EEC Product Liability Directive to become a model for private or
collective class action litigation, enforcing joint private and public
rights in Europe as they are enforced in the United States.' 42
Instead, the United States should be aware of the diversity of
consumer protection measures existing in Europe and attempt to
work through the OECD, in which the United States already has an
active presence, to develop the best available consumer protection
measures with the least possible bureaucracy. If cooperating with
the OECD leads to coordination of consumer rights and normalizes
efforts between the OECD nations and the EEC, it will be to the clear
advantage of free world trade and economic growth.
139 See the differences in the semi-official statements made at the Council of Ministers
by the EEC and subsequent opinions of national lawyers. BEUC NEws LEGAL SUPP.,
Nov./Dec. 1985, at 20.
140 See supra note 1I. Because the state funds social and medical programs, the state
has a greater interest in the social cost of product liability than in the United States. See
supra note 20.
141 See supra notes 18, 23.
142 See supra note 26.
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